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Introduction 25 
Academic understanding of conformity, differentiation and change in organizational fields has 26 
been advanced in recent years by a burgeoning literature drawing on the concept of institutional 27 
logics. From its foundations in neo-institutionalism, the institutional logics perspective has 28 
rapidly advanced to theorize how diverse institutional forces not only compete for dominance, 29 
but also frequently interact and co-exist, and how this affects organizational and individual 30 
behaviour. It offers a rich explanatory framework that accounts for heterogeneity as well as 31 
conformity, and which better allows for the potential of agency as well as structure in enacting, 32 
contesting and transforming institutions. 33 
Within this approach, a particularly vibrant thread of research has focused on the 34 
consequences of institutional complexity—that is, the presence of multiple logics with 35 
conflicting, or at least diverging, prescriptions for behaviour. At the macro level, theoretical 36 
and empirical studies have, as a rule, found that institutional complexity adds further 37 
constraints to organizations’ and individuals’ behaviour, since it poses expectations from 38 
additional audiences, all of whom must be satisfied for legitimacy (Pache & Santos 2010; 39 
Kraatz & Block 2008). Yet such predictions have not always been borne out in micro-level 40 
studies of individual behaviour under conditions of complexity, which often find that actors 41 
‘on the ground’ exercise a remarkable degree of autonomy in their day-to-day practice (e.g. 42 
Hallett 2010). The objective of this study, therefore, is to attempt to bridge this gap, through a 43 
longitudinal comparative case study of the consequences of a period of intensifying 44 
institutional complexity for actor autonomy, in the English National Health Service (NHS). 45 
Existing theory predicts that this period of change, which saw the increasing centralization and 46 
formalization of institutional expectations (Pache & Santos 2010; Greenwood et al. 2011; 47 
Thornton 2002), would impose more exacting expectations on individual-level behaviour. But 48 
we found a mixed picture, with two cases remaining recalcitrant to changing institutional 49 
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prescriptions, while in two others actors’ behaviour was more conforming. We seek to add to 50 
an emerging literature on organizational-level factors in the constitution of institutional logics 51 
(e.g. Besharov & Smith 2014) by elucidating this meso-level influence on the degree of latitude 52 
enjoyed by actors in the face of apparently determinative institutional prescriptions. In so 53 
doing, we outline alternative forms of organizational influence on the experience of logics ‘on 54 
the ground’, and begin to identify the building blocks for a bridge between macro-level and 55 
micro-level work on institutional logics that has to date been missing. We respond to calls for 56 
research that takes seriously the partial and contingent nature of agency in institutional fields 57 
(Thornton et al. 2012; Greenwood et al. 2010; Waldorff et al. 2013), and accounts for 58 
institutional complexity more adequately by considering more than two logics (Greenwood et 59 
al. 2010; 2011; Goodrick & Reay 2011). 60 
We begin by reviewing the institutional logics literature, including its propositions on 61 
how logics co-exist, and how actors respond to this. We highlight the disconnection between 62 
macro- and micro-level studies, and argue that, while micro-level studies have gone some way 63 
to fulfilling their promise of returning neo-institutionalism to its ‘microfoundations’ (Powell & 64 
Colyvas 2008), the methodological approaches predominant in this literature mean that in 65 
aggregate it risks overstating the “avenues for partial autonomy” (Thornton et al. 2012, p.7) 66 
available to individual actors. Then we briefly describe our empirical setting, a particularly 67 
complex institutional field in terms of the dimensions set out by Greenwood et al. (2011). After 68 
accounting for our methods, we explore the dynamics of institutional change and the divergent 69 
consequences for our four cases through time. We then discuss our findings and their 70 
implications for theory and future research. 71 
Institutional logics: coexistence and its consequences 72 
Over the last 15-20 years, the institutional logics approach has offered an increasingly 73 
sophisticated means of accounting for change and stability in organizational fields. Institutional 74 
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logics are “the socially constructed, historical pattern of material practices, assumptions, 75 
values, beliefs, and rules by which individuals produce and reproduce their material 76 
subsistence, organize time and space, and provide meaning to their social reality” (Thornton & 77 
Ocasio 1998, p.804). In other words, institutional logics are the key means by which social 78 
reality is reproduced and changed. Distinctive domains of social practice—organizational 79 
fields—have their own sets of institutional logics, derived from societal-level logics, from the 80 
logics of neighbouring fields, and from the endogenous action of the individuals who populate 81 
them (Thornton et al. 2012). 82 
Formative research within the institutional logics approach focused primarily on the 83 
dominance of given logics: how this was created, maintained and challenged (e.g. Scott et al. 84 
2000). Increasingly, however, research has found that many fields are characterized by the co-85 
existence of a plurality of logics—often with no single logic dominant in determining actors’ 86 
disposition and behaviour. Rather than representing a temporary, transitional phase between 87 
epochs of dominance by a single logic, “some fields are better portrayed as leaning towards the 88 
‘relative incoherence’ of enduring, competing logics” (Greenwood et al. 2011, p.323). 89 
Greenwood et al. (2011, p.332) note that research on institutional complexity has tended to 90 
assume that coexisting logics are “inherently incompatible,” but more recent studies have 91 
challenged this assumption. Several have found that contradictory logics may coexist in an 92 
organizational field, often in a kind of ‘creative tension’ which means that their influences 93 
affect actors simultaneously (e.g. Reay & Hinings 2005; 2009; Lounsbury 2007; Greenwood 94 
et al. 2010; Goodrick & Reay 2011; Martin et al. 2015). The plurality of institutional 95 
prescriptions available means that a diversity of actor behaviours is often in evidence: for 96 
example, Lounsbury (2007) finds that different fund managers operate according to ‘trustee’ 97 
and ‘performance’ logics concurrently, depending on their geographical location. 98 
The presence of divergent behaviours, however, should not automatically be interpreted 99 
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as signalling greater actor autonomy. The influence of logics, studies have found, is often 100 
‘segmented’, such that different groups of actors are affected differentially by logics’ 101 
prescriptions (Reay & Hinings 2009; Pache & Santos 2010; Goodrick & Reay 2011). Reay and 102 
Hinings (2009, p.646), for example, find that the rivalry between an incumbent logic of medical 103 
professionalism and an increasingly powerful logic of business-like healthcare is managed by 104 
collaboration between physicians and administrators, with each group maintaining its 105 
independence but engaging “in collaborations that result in mutually desirable outcomes and 106 
thus sustain the co-existing logics.” Often, therefore, studies of sustained institutional 107 
complexity find that carriers of different logics—for example, professional and managerial 108 
groups—remain bound to their ‘home’ logics and referent audiences, and are able to continue 109 
to act in accordance with their expectations. Alternatively, the same group of actors may have 110 
to satisfy the expectations of more than one audience for legitimacy, such that different aspects 111 
of their practice are governed by different logics (e.g. Smets et al. 2015). 112 
To observe that multiple logics are available within a field, therefore, is not to imply that 113 
individuals are able to pick and choose freely from their prescriptions. Due to their prior 114 
socialization, the expectations of their referent audiences, and other structural determinants, 115 
actors continue to face the constraints presented by the need for legitimacy, as identified by the 116 
earliest exponents of neo-institutionalism. The most recent developments in our understanding 117 
of the consequences of institutionally complex fields for actor autonomy arguably retain this 118 
structural focus. A promising recent line of inquiry is the consequences of the specific 119 
configuration of logics in a field: the ‘constellation’ in which they are formed (Reay & Hinings 120 
2009; Goodrick & Reay 2011; Waldorff et al. 2013). The same logics may be configured 121 
differently in different fields, with important consequences for actor behaviour, as Waldorff et 122 
al. (2013) demonstrate with a comparison of Danish and Canadian healthcare. A similar set of 123 
logics existed in each setting, but they were arranged in rather different constellations, so that 124 
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a complementary relationship between market and professional logics in Canada led to changes 125 
in behaviour that did not arise in Denmark, where the relationship was more antagonistic. 126 
Waldorff et al. (2013, p.125) claim that “the concept of constellation of logics [offers] a new 127 
way of understanding agency. We see that it is the arrangement and relationship among logics 128 
that helps to explain how action can be both constrained and enabled.” Yet their analysis 129 
remains at the level of the field: the constellation of logics is a product of field-level dynamics 130 
(most notably, in this example, incentive structures and regulatory regimes), and these 131 
determine the repertoires available to different actors. There is less sense in such analyses of 132 
the way, as Smets and Jarzabkowski (2013, p.1301) have it, “constellations are constructed 133 
rather than given, and which dimensions of agency drive their construction.” 134 
Partly in response to the shortcomings of the macro-level focus of much of the work on 135 
institutional logics, another—largely separate—body of literature considers the micro-level 136 
enactment of logics by individuals at the ‘coalface’ (Barley 2008) of everyday work—that is, 137 
the unremarkable, day-to-day interactions of actors in institutionalized fields, far removed from 138 
the battles between institutions and high-level institutional entrepreneurs. Scholars in this line 139 
argue that much neo-institutional research neglects “interpretation and subjectivity, which […] 140 
offers considerable degrees of agency and freedom to reinterpret and even change institutional 141 
templates” (Bévort & Suddaby 2015). Where institutionalists have considered agency, they 142 
have focused disproportionately on what Smets et al. (2012, p.878) call “‘hypermuscular’ 143 
institutional entrepreneurship”: the work of “heroic actors” (Powell & Colyvas 2008, p.277) 144 
with unusual levels of individual or collective clout, who feed back into the constitution of 145 
institutional logics themselves (e.g. Greenwood et al. 2002; Murray 2010). What this neglects, 146 
critics argue, is the everyday work of lower-profile actors who nevertheless are active in their 147 
interpretation and application of institutional logics. 148 
Accordingly, work on ‘inhabited institutions’ (Hallett & Ventresca 2006) has examined 149 
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the lived experience of actors in institutionalized fields, and the practices they pursue, 150 
consciously or unconsciously, that reproduce or challenge institutional expectations. Often 151 
deploying ethnomethodological approaches, these studies highlight the interpretive, non-152 
deterministic processes that translate situations of institutional complexity into day-to-day 153 
reality (e.g. Heimer 1999; Binder 2007; Hallett 2010; Everitt 2013; McPherson & Sauder 2013; 154 
Smets & Jarzabkowski 2013; Smets et al. 2015). They vividly demonstrate Powell and 155 
Colyvas’s  (2008, p.277) assertion that a division between “heroic actors and cultural dopes 156 
[is] a poor representation of the gamut of human behavior.” For example, Binder (2007) shows 157 
how professionals in different parts of the same organization meld together institutional 158 
demands, personal beliefs and localized meaning systems in the way they enact their 159 
organization’s mission. Everitt (2013) looks at the professional socialization of teachers as 160 
agentic and active, combining institutional prescriptions with social influences and personal 161 
preferences. Such work focuses above all on the everyday work of actors who are not in the 162 
business of “intentionally pursuing a clear institutional ‘vision’” (Smets & Jarzabkowski 2013, 163 
p.1300): they are not seeking to transform the rules of the game in an institutional field, but to 164 
forge a legitimate path through complex organizational settings characterized by a profusion 165 
of prescriptions, power relationships and personal interests (Smets et al. 2015). 166 
Taken together, these studies provide an important corrective to neo-institutionalism’s 167 
focus on the power of institutional logics. Yet their key methodological advantage—detailed 168 
examination of practice as it takes place in real-life environments—also creates a limitation. 169 
With few exceptions, these papers offer in-depth understanding of single organizations or even 170 
single organizational sub-units, rather than cross-sectional comparisons. This means that they 171 
are unlikely to reveal organizational-level contingencies in the way that, for example, a 172 
comparative case-study approach might. They also tend to ascribe a remarkable degree of 173 
autonomy to individual actors—perhaps in consequence of case selection, or of a desire to 174 
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challenge the structuralist predictions of macro-level studies, or of the preferences of journals 175 
for studies that indicate new or unexpected findings. In aggregate, these studies suggest that 176 
actors enjoy a great deal of latitude, in contradiction to the findings of the macro-level 177 
institutionalist literature. If a macro-level focus fetishizes structure, then a risk of a micro-level 178 
focus is fetishizing agency. Thus, echoing Hardy and Maguire’s (2008, p.199) critique of the 179 
institutional entrepreneurship literature, we need to “ensure that the efforts of institutional 180 
theorists to incorporate agency—in order to move beyond an over-emphasis on the constraining 181 
effects of institutions—do not swing too far in the opposite direction.” 182 
What has been less prominent in the literature is examination of the circumstances in 183 
which such agency is possible. With this in mind, our study considers the consequences of 184 
institutional complexity, and rapid institutional change, in four organizations in the same field, 185 
which exhibited divergent outcomes in terms of the room for manoeuvre achieved by the 186 
central actors, each of whom sought to maintain a novel service intervention that became 187 
misaligned with the prescriptions of the dominant logic within the field. We sacrifice the 188 
ethnomethodological depth of the ‘inhabited institutions’ tradition for comparative breadth, but 189 
nevertheless offer a detailed, qualitative, longitudinal study covering seven years of change. 190 
Our approach is not without precedent: the work of Reay and Hinings (2005; 2009) similarly 191 
combines field-level analysis with qualitative interviews with key actors, but whereas their 192 
focus is the consequences for the composition of the field, ours is the consequences for the 193 
autonomy of everyday actors (not muscular institutional entrepreneurs) at the coalface. 194 
Whereas the success of institutional entrepreneurs is often attributed to the power deriving from 195 
their social position or to exceptional creative vision (Hardy & Maguire 2008), we address the 196 
question of what enables or constrains these ‘coalface’ actors, who cannot rely on such 197 
attributes, in acting autonomously. We ask: what are the conditions that precipitate and inhibit 198 
actors’ ability to defy changing institutional prescriptions in defence of their own beliefs and 199 
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interests? 200 
Institutional logics in English healthcare, 2005-2011 201 
The field of healthcare is quintessentially institutionally complex. It has offered a fertile ground 202 
for the development of institutional theory, with key contributions arising from analysis of 203 
healthcare systems globally (e.g. Scott et al. 2000; Reay & Hinings 2005). As Pache and Santos 204 
(2010) note, healthcare is a fragmented field where stakeholders from a wide range of logics 205 
co-exist, but is also dependent on a small number of resource providers (in England’s case, the 206 
state). “The most complex fields for organizations to navigate,” argue Pache and Santos (2010, 207 
p.458), “are moderately centralized fields” of this kind, “characterized by the competing 208 
influence of multiple and misaligned players whose influence is not dominant yet is potent 209 
enough to be imposed on organizations.” Besharov and Smith (2014) conceptualize such fields 210 
as combining ‘high centrality’ (with multiple logics central to organizational functioning) with 211 
‘low compatibility’ (because the logics’ prescriptions are contradictory), and suggest that such 212 
fields produce ‘contested’ organizations characterized by extensive conflict. 213 
In common with healthcare systems worldwide (e.g. Scott et al. 2000), the NHS is the 214 
site of long-term conflict among logics. Of particular note is the influence of the professional, 215 
corporate and market logics. The professional logic in healthcare can be characterized as the 216 
dominance of professionals over not just clinical but organizational decision-making, and 217 
deference among others (managers, patients and lower-status clinicians) to (medical) 218 
professional knowledge (Reay & Hinings 2009). The market and corporate logics are 219 
sometimes conflated (e.g. Currie & Spyridonidis 2016), but we follow Thornton (2002) in 220 
distinguishing between them as two potentially complementary, but conceptually separate, 221 
institutional logics. The corporate logic is realized through managerial techniques for 222 
controlling professionals’ activity, for example performance-management regimes, 223 
standardization of clinical care, and development of capacity for surveillance and audit. The 224 
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market logic represents a shift towards use of competition among providers and market signals 225 
to induce improvement and contain costs. Traditionally dominated by medical professionalism, 226 
the English system was subject to increasing managerial and market influences from the 1980s 227 
onward, as the state sought to challenge professional jurisdictions and provider monopolies as 228 
part of wider ‘new public management’-style reforms (Ferlie 1996). Within this longer-term 229 
shift in the balance of logics, the period of our study, 2005-2011, can be seen as a particularly 230 
turbulent period of change, marking as it did the end of an unprecedented increase in healthcare 231 
spending in England, followed by a rapid retrenchment into austerity. Government funding for 232 
healthcare rose rapidly in the early 2000s (at a real-terms rate of 7% per annum) before 233 
plateauing and finally declining slightly relative to GDP (OECD 2014). The exogenous jolt of 234 
the global financial crisis from 2008 was partly responsible for this transition, but by this point 235 
the government had already begun to shift its focus from increasing capacity to increasing 236 
productivity (Secretary of State for Health 2008). In 2006 the government required that the 237 
NHS’s £520-million deficit be transformed into a £250-million surplus by 2008 (Day 2006), 238 
and as the financial situation became straitened, in 2009 the NHS chief executive called for 239 
efficiency savings of 20% within five years (Nicholson 2009). 240 
This turnaround in the financial environment translated into pronounced shifts in the 241 
organizational field, with the government seeking to increase the influence of market and 242 
corporate logics. Firstly, in line with the corporate logic, there was an increased emphasis on 243 
more managerial approaches to improving quality (e.g. care pathways, skill-mix 244 
reconfiguration) (Secretary of State for Health 2008). Secondly, again following the corporate 245 
logic, the government introduced a more intensive regime of performance management of NHS 246 
provider organizations, including a pledge to reduce waiting lists to 18 weeks, backed by the 247 
ability to invoke Draconian sanctions against ‘failing’ organizations (Lewis & Appleby 2006). 248 
Thirdly, following the market logic, the government took renewed steps to increase 249 
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competition in the NHS. Although an internal market for acute healthcare services had existed 250 
since the early 1990s, further steps were taken from 2006 to extend the scope of the market, by 251 
increasing service provision outside traditional hospitals (Secretary of State for Health 2006), 252 
increasing the power of ‘commissioners’ (holders of healthcare budgets for a locality, 253 
responsible for paying for the healthcare needs of the local population) over providers (Ham 254 
2008), and removing all responsibility for providing care from commissioning organizations, 255 
known as primary care trusts (PCTs), so that services were tendered competitively rather than 256 
offered ‘in house’. Thus there was a sustained effort to ensure that the logic of the market 257 
pervaded the entire healthcare system, including areas that had previously been immune to its 258 
influence. 259 
This period, then, was characterized by particularly intensive change, as government 260 
sought to adapt to the end of a period of sustained increases in funding by introducing evermore 261 
extensive market and managerial policies into the NHS system. Of course, changes in policy 262 
do not instantaneously give rise to a shift in the logics governing actors’ behaviour; 263 
nevertheless we can detect in these policies an attempt to strengthen the market and corporate 264 
logics—and correspondingly weaken the professional logic. At the start of the period, the NHS 265 
was enjoying unprecedented real-terms increases in funding; by the end, it was facing 266 
unprecedented levels of efficiency savings. A system of performance management that was 267 
emerging at the start had grown into a fully-fledged set of central-government prescriptions by 268 
the end, accompanied by the ability to ‘punish’ non-compliant or ineffective organizations with 269 
sanctions or wholesale replacement of management. At the beginning, only secondary-care 270 
services provided by hospitals were subject to a competitive system of resource allocation, but 271 
by the end all community-based services, previously provided in-house by PCTs, were exposed 272 
to the same expectation. The period was thus characterized by great institutional turbulence, 273 
with increasing centralization and formalization (Greenwood et al. 2011; Pache & Santos 274 
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2010) of the market and corporate logics. 275 
Setting and methods 276 
Our paper follows the trajectory of four new service developments over this period, through a 277 
longitudinal understanding over the period 2005-2011 of how those responsible for leading the 278 
development of these services—the ‘focal actors’—and other stakeholders responded to the 279 
changing institutional environment. The four services in question had their roots in a national 280 
government initiative in 2004 which aimed to encourage the ‘mainstreaming’ of clinical-281 
genetics knowledge across the English NHS. This initiative (Secretary of State for Health 2003) 282 
provided pump-priming funding to 27 pilot services, each of which sought to introduce a new 283 
approach to delivering genetics services in its locality—for example by changing the way risk 284 
assessment or counselling was provided—but maintaining professional control over this. Our 285 
team evaluated the initiative, studying the changes attempted in a theoretical sample of 11 of 286 
the services. The initiative ran on the basis that successful services would be sustained using 287 
local monies, and host organizations committed to this as a condition of funding. However, in 288 
the event, when pilot funding ended in 2007, only a minority of services were sustained, 289 
including just four of the 11 we studied (see Table 1). The challenges inherent in sustaining 290 
organizational innovations are an area of significant policy interest in the UK (e.g. Buchanan 291 
et al. 2007), and we therefore developed, and succeeded in obtaining external funding for, a 292 
follow-up study that revisited the four sustained services post-pilot, to examine in more detail 293 
what had made a difference in their successful continuation. This paper derives from both the 294 
original evaluation and the follow-up study, offering a longitudinal analysis of the work of 295 
actors involved in the four services covering the seven-year period 2005-2011. While we lack 296 
the data from the seven discontinued services to consider them in detail in this paper, Table 1 297 
shows how they resemble and differ from our sample of four according to key variables, and 298 
briefly summarizes the reasons for their termination. 299 
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[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 300 
For our original evaluation, our sample was driven by a theoretical approach to obtain 301 
variation in key variables of interest, inter alia host organization (e.g. hospitals versus primary-302 
care organization), professional affiliation of focal actor (e.g. doctors, nurses), and disciplinary 303 
affiliation (e.g. specialist geneticists, other specialist clinicians, generalists). These variables 304 
are highlighted as pertinent in the existing literature (e.g. Battilana 2011); they were 305 
supplemented in our sampling strategy by other variables raised as of potential significance in 306 
discussions with our funder, such as clinical focus of the service and amount of funding 307 
allocated. Cases exhibiting various combinations of these variables were sampled to facilitate 308 
cross-case comparison. Our follow-up study included all sites from this original sample that 309 
were sustained with further funding beyond the pilot period (4/11). While they differ in detail, 310 
all four embodied a professionally led approach to improving genetics provision by breaking 311 
down organizational boundaries (e.g. between specialisms or between primary and secondary 312 
care) that gave rise to disjointed provision. Given that the focal actors in each case were 313 
successful in obtaining post-pilot funding where their peers in the other seven services failed, 314 
they could be seen as exceptional; but as our findings demonstrate, they did not have significant 315 
power over local decision-making. In one site (Bolbourne), ongoing funding ceased after six 316 
months; in the other three, it continues today. 317 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 318 
Table 2 summarizes the four cases. Of particular note in the composition of our sample 319 
are the similarities and differences in two dimensions: professional allegiance of focal actor; 320 
and organizational host. Whereas Ashover’s focal actor was a nurse by training who had more 321 
recently become involved in a managerial capacity in her organization, the other three cases 322 
were led by physicians of varying backgrounds. The focal actor in Bolbourne was a general 323 
practitioner (family physician), while Carsridge was led by a clinical geneticist and Dovington 324 
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by a specialist physician in the ‘mainstream’ clinical area into which genetics provision was 325 
being incorporated (we leave this unspecified to protect participant anonymity). Nurses are of 326 
lower status than doctors in English healthcare as worldwide (Battilana 2011); the 327 
intraprofessional hierarchy within medicine tends to place specialists above generalists, 328 
although the changes afoot in the English system explicitly sought to raise the standing of 329 
general practitioners and increase their influence on resource allocation (Secretary of State for 330 
Health 2006). The host organizations in Ashover and Bolbourne were both primary care 331 
organizations: PCTs responsible for budget-holding and resource allocation, but which also at 332 
the start of the period provided some services in-house, including these genetics services. 333 
Carsridge and Dovington’s services were hosted by acute hospital trusts: large hospital 334 
organizations providing services to the populations covered by several PCTs. 335 
Both studies used a combination of qualitative methods, drawing primarily on in-depth 336 
interviews with key actors (e.g. focal actors, others involved in service delivery, those in key 337 
decision-making and budget-holding roles beyond the services), supplemented by 338 
observational data and document collection and analysis. In total, across the two studies, we 339 
undertook 83 interviews over four time points, broken down as shown in Table 2. For the 340 
original evaluation, we undertook the majority of interviews in 2005-6 (hereafter referred to as 341 
T1), with follow-up interviews in 2008 (T2). For the second study, we undertook further 342 
interviews in 2010 (T3) and 2011 (T4). Thus our data offer a longitudinal perspective on the 343 
trajectories of the four cases spanning seven years, albeit with data collection unevenly 344 
distributed across the period. Interviews ranged from approximately 30 to 130 minutes, with 345 
an average length of around one hour. Our topic guide in the original evaluation covered a wide 346 
range of issues, most notably for this paper the rationale for the service, how it related to and 347 
modified existing provision, relationships with key stakeholders and organizations, plans for 348 
the future, and (at T2) progress towards maintaining provision post-pilot. In the follow-up study 349 
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our topic guide focused more specifically on the trials and tribulations of sustaining these small 350 
service innovations in a changing environment, the degree to which they had evolved in their 351 
service models, and the organizational, financial and relational work that had been done and 352 
was anticipated to maintain their existence. 353 
All interviews were transcribed in full. They were analysed using an approach informed 354 
by the constant-comparative method (Charmaz 2007), with specific attention directed towards 355 
certain ‘sensitizing concepts’—ideas that had informed our thinking in developing the study, 356 
derived from prior conversations, analysis of policy documents, and the existing literature on 357 
healthcare and organizational change—covering the social, professional, organizational and 358 
policy influences on service innovation and sustainability. We thus developed themes both 359 
inductively and deductively, to cover issues derived from existing conceptual frameworks, but 360 
also issues that emerged from close, repeated readings of the data sources. GPM and SW both 361 
read the source materials several times over, and GPM then led coding and analysis using 362 
NVivo software. This involved an initial ‘broad-brush’ coding of all documents to identify 363 
portions that offered potential insights for the purpose of this paper (since a substantial 364 
proportion of the material from the original evaluation was not relevant), informed by our 365 
existing knowledge. In discussion with the other authors, GPM then undertook several rounds 366 
of more refined, inductive coding, firstly coding items in terms of the actions described by 367 
interviewees in relation to the development and sustaining of the services (Charmaz 2007), and 368 
then a further round of more theoretically oriented coding that sought to identify the influence 369 
and enactment of different logics in the activities interviewees described and the way they 370 
justified them. He then developed case histories describing the trajectories of the four cases 371 
over the period studied, which he discussed with co-authors before returning for a final round 372 
of coding, merging some existing codes and disaggregating others. 373 
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Findings 374 
We present our findings over three sections. First, we examine the way the services were set 375 
up, and the impact of the rapid shift in the policy landscape for the continued legitimacy of 376 
services premised on a professional logic. Next, we consider the focal actors’ response to this 377 
challenge, which was differentially successful across the four cases, with very different 378 
outcomes in terms of the logics that were most evident in actors’ behaviour. Finally, we explore 379 
the reasons for this. By examining the data from across the cases in more detail, we suggest 380 
that the answer lies neither in the constellation of logics present in the field, nor solely in the 381 
creative capacity of the focal actors to make instrumental use of these logics, but in a 382 
confluence of micro- and macro-level circumstances, mediated at the meso (organizational) 383 
level, that meant that institutional repertoires that were accessible and held legitimacy in some 384 
cases were beyond the reach of focal actors in others. 385 
Professionally led services and shifting institutional logics 386 
When originally designed and initiated in 2004 through central government funding, all four 387 
services embraced a model premised on professional ownership and accountability. The white 388 
paper that announced the initiative had emphasised the role of clinical professionals in devising 389 
new genetics services (Secretary of State for Health 2003), and accordingly, all the projects 390 
funded were led by clinicians, not managers—primarily clinical geneticists, but also other 391 
physicians, and nurses. Focal actors emphasised the centrality of a professional ethic in their 392 
approaches to delivering the new services, though in slightly different ways. In Carsridge and 393 
Dovington, they stressed the importance of ensuring that genetic knowledge was mainstreamed 394 
in a way that maintained or enhanced specialist involvement, rather than reducing it to a 395 
protocolized approach that might be more in line with the corporate logic. In the two primary-396 
care cases, Ashover and Bolbourne, the emphasis was on integrating genetics into a generalist 397 
model of care, emphasising holism and the wider public health: 398 
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“We were aware right from the early stages that patients really didn’t get a terribly good 399 
deal in terms of any kind of comprehensive service. There was very little continuity and 400 
I thought we could do a better job.” (Focal actor (mainstream physician), Dovington, 401 
T1) 402 
“Anybody who’s concerned that they’ve got a family history of cancer and are at risk 403 
can be referred into our service. […] We also do a lot of health promotion so we don’t 404 
actually just talk about cancer, we also talk about things related to cancer like diet, like 405 
giving up smoking, sunbathing, those types of things.” (Focal actor (nurse-manager), 406 
Ashover, T1) 407 
Each focal actor thus enacted the professional logic in the way they set up their service, albeit 408 
with variations on the theme reflecting their professional affiliation: it was presented in terms 409 
of esoteric expertise by the specialist physicians in Carsridge and Dovington, but in terms of 410 
holistic, generalist care by the nurse and family physician in Ashover and Bolbourne. 411 
 Each focal actor had obtained agreement in principle from their host organization to 412 
continue to fund the service following the pilot period. The shift in the policy landscape from 413 
2005, however, threw such plans into disarray. An increased emphasis on markets and targets, 414 
and the organizational changes that accompanied it, had a marked effect on genetics service 415 
developments, and meant that commitments made years earlier counted for little: 416 
“We’ve gone from a position of completely unprecedented investment in the health 417 
service, where it was attractive to invest money in bits of the service which had not 418 
previously had large amounts of money invested in them. [… But now] we’re in a 419 
position where it’s not clear how we’re going to continue to provide what everybody 420 
would regard as core NHS services, [so] slightly unusual developments are much less 421 
easy to make.” (Director, genetics service, Bolbourne, T3) 422 
There was a tangible shift in the language of those in decision-making positions in all four 423 
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cases, towards an acknowledgement of the need for parsimony and demonstrable value. 424 
Professionally led services, in the view of these stakeholders, needed to address changing 425 
expectations around, for example, consumer-responsiveness in a competitive environment that 426 
mirrored the market logic: 427 
“The mistake I’ve seen a lot of services make is that they try really, really hard to 428 
establish because they think there’s a need to convince people, there’s a need to get 429 
funded, and they start seeing stakeholders, but then it stops. […] Products don’t survive 430 
in the market very long unless they inhabit the environment they’re in, learn from it and 431 
modify based on their clients’ continuously changing needs. And that’s what 432 
differentiates successful products from not-successful products.” (Director of 433 
Commissioning, Ashover, T3) 434 
As they reached the end of their pilot funding and considered how to maintain their services, 435 
therefore, focal actors found themselves in an environment that had changed markedly. The 436 
rise of the market and corporate logics in policy demanded evidence of cost savings or cost-437 
effectiveness, and this posed a threat to services founded on a different logic. But as we see 438 
next, the ultimate outcome of this shift in logics at the field level for the four services was very 439 
different. 440 
The outcomes: domination; resistance; transformation 441 
Focal actors in all four cases worked hard to defend the services they had built, and secure 442 
continued funding for them in this changing environment, while ensuring they remained true 443 
to the professional logic on which the services had been founded. As noted above, all four 444 
succeeded initially in obtaining ongoing funding, in contrast to their peers. But beyond this, 445 
their success varied. 446 
At one extreme, in Bolbourne, despite the focal actor’s extensive efforts, local budget-447 
holders decided six months later to terminate their funding for the service. The focal actor, a 448 
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family physician, made robust arguments for the continued importance of her service and the 449 
holistic understanding of the place of genetics in wider primary care that it promoted,. 450 
Alongside a costed business case, her efforts included compiling evidence of impact in the 451 
form of “e-mails, comments from other GPs saying, ‘This is great, the website’s fantastic, 452 
really good about having the advice line’,” “pictures in the [local] newspapers saying what a 453 
wonderful thing,” and lobbying commissioners and genetics specialists: “I think we covered 454 
most avenues really.” But as she bluntly reflected in her final (T4) interview: 455 
“From an outside perspective perhaps it seemed a bit woolly what I was doing, but I 456 
think it was actually much more worthwhile to focus my attentions in that way. It wasn’t 457 
as sexy and didn’t look quite as good; I wasn’t seeing all these patients.” 458 
Essentially, she found that arguments premised on a logic of professionalism failed to hold 459 
sway in an environment now dominated by concerns around efficiency and throughput (“seeing 460 
all these patients”). Her view was confirmed by the decision-makers themselves. The director 461 
of the genetics service felt that the focal actor was “selling something which […] 462 
commissioners didn’t want to buy” (T3). Another decision-maker was even franker: 463 
“It isn’t going to release huge savings, […] so when commissioners are prioritizing, it 464 
will not tick all the boxes I’m afraid. It’s undeniable that well informed GP specialists 465 
able to support their GP colleagues can have an impact both on improving resources 466 
but more importantly making sure that patients get the right service at the right time, 467 
but I think in the current economic situation it’s going to be difficult to see many 468 
primary-care genetics services being established.” (Primary care commissioning lead, 469 
T3) 470 
Further work undertaken by the focal actor to resurrect her service following termination of 471 
funding was unsuccessful, and by the end of the study period she was resigned to the fact that 472 
“it’s just gone back to how it was. The website is the only lasting legacy” (T4). 473 
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At the other extreme, in Carsridge and Dovington, focal actors were much more 474 
successful in defending the professional logic in the changing field, such that their services 475 
remained in place, largely unaffected by the wider environment and the rise of the market logic 476 
for the duration of the period studied. As the focal actor in Dovington put it, with some surprise, 477 
“actually to move us into the whole commissioning process and to make it sustainable was a 478 
far more fraught process potentially than it actually was” (T3). The model of service delivery 479 
continued to follow a professional logic, with patient-centredness taking precedence over 480 
throughput or efficiency savings: 481 
“Patient satisfaction is high, clinic sizes are relatively small although efficient, and time 482 
spent with medical staff and nursing staff is higher and so we get a much better patient 483 
experience and outcome with all of that. We’re always going to be able to be criticized 484 
on the basis that we’re providing a luxury service as opposed to an economy service, 485 
but they’re a very vulnerable group of patients.” (Clinical geneticist, T4) 486 
Similarly, in Carsridge, ongoing funding was secured and the service remained faithful to the 487 
original design, without any challenge to the professionally determined service model: “I don’t 488 
think there was ever any major problems: it just seemed to happen” (Genetic counsellor, T3). 489 
Only minor changes were instigated, such as adjustment of the skill mix to enhance the 490 
professional responsibilities of the clinical staff: “the function of the team is exactly the same, 491 
but we have up-skilled one of the administrators to take some of the more mundane activities 492 
from [the clinicians]. And I suppose that’s the biggest change actually” (Focal actor (clinical 493 
geneticist), T3). Whereas in Bolbourne, adherence to the professional logic meant that the 494 
service was seen as anachronistic by budget-holders (“selling something which […] 495 
commissioners didn’t want to buy”), the services in Carsridge and Dovington retained 496 
legitimacy with key decision-makers despite their avowedly professionally driven ethos: 497 
“To me it’s actually really pretty streamlined, a very efficient service. […] What 498 
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they’ve done in terms of bringing things up into the twenty-first century is of value to 499 
the population, so I think they provide a valuable service.” (Clinical director, Carsridge, 500 
T3) 501 
Between the contrasting experiences of Bolbourne, and Carsridge and Dovington, lay 502 
Ashover’s. Here, funding was sustained throughout the period, but achieving this required 503 
fundamental changes to the ethos and delivery model of the service. At the behest of local 504 
decision-makers, the original holistic, public-health focus of the service gave way to something 505 
much narrower in remit, and better aligned with corporate and market expectations around 506 
efficiency and performance against specific measures. The focal actor was expected to agree 507 
to a “service specification” with “specific key performance indicators” developed with 508 
managers, “which I disagreed with but had to put them forward anyway” (T4). The service was 509 
incorporated into a managed care pathway, with a much more tightly defined service-level 510 
agreement that focused on triaging patients at possible risk of inherited cancer. Alongside this, 511 
more forensic examination of the service’s activities was introduced: “we have now a scoring 512 
of interventions, sort of whether it’s a low intervention or a high intervention, […] and they’re 513 
now reviewing that data collection as well, so there’ll be a whole new system coming out” 514 
(Focal actor (nurse-manager), T4). The positioning of the service within a managed pathway, 515 
along with this extra scrutiny and oversight for managers and commissioners, gave the service 516 
legitimacy with key decision-makers. It was now aligned with normative conceptualizations of 517 
how to deliver efficient and well managed healthcare, as part of a defined pathway that offered 518 
a cheaper alternative to hospital-based care: 519 
“Community services we know are darn site cheaper than secondary and tertiary care 520 
services. […] It’s a community-led service, you know, and necessarily, it’s broken 521 
down the boundaries between primary care and secondary care. So it’s a pathway-522 
driven service from the community which ticks all the boxes at the moment of things 523 
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being community-driven, closer to home.” (Associate medical director, T3) 524 
Besides more focused performance management, this also brought a much stricter set of 525 
eligibility criteria for patients. For example, the service took fewer self-referrals from worried 526 
patients who had not been screened by their family physicians, and was contemplating stopping 527 
self-referrals altogether since budget-holders were unlikely to see this is as appropriate 528 
expenditure: 529 
“When we first started in the pilot phase, it was very much self-referrals that 530 
outweighed any professional referrals. Whereas now I would say that’s reversed and 531 
self-referrals probably come at the bottom of the referral rate and it’s secondary-care 532 
and GP referrals that probably top. […] I don’t know how GPs will feel about patients 533 
referring themselves in, because they’re not going to have control of that budget. (Focal 534 
actor (nurse-manager), T4) 535 
This process of adaptation to the new realities of the market continued through time. Between 536 
T3 and T4, as part of its continued funding, the service was incorporated into a different 537 
organization with much greater managerial capacity than its original host, and with a strong 538 
market orientation: 539 
“[New host organization] have an operating model which they would apply to all of 540 
their products. So […] they’ll have to change certain aspects of the way they just run 541 
the service to fit in with their corporate model. […] If they can’t robustly describe the 542 
value this service would have on the whole of cancer care, then the more likely the risk 543 
that this service won’t be commissioned.” (Commissioner, T3) 544 
 The future for the service looked more secure—it had reinvented itself as part of an integrated 545 
care pathway with a tightly defined remit and expectations around efficient resource use—but 546 
this had meant fundamental changes to its service-delivery model. From her original affiliation 547 
with the professional logic, the focal actor had been forced to fundamentally realign herself to 548 
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the corporate and market logics, in terms of both the discursive justification, and the service 549 
provided. 550 
Making sense of the contrasting outcomes 551 
From similar starting positions, then, the four cases exhibited divergent trajectories. While the 552 
focal actors in Carsridge and Dovington continued to espouse the professional logic, and 553 
maintained services formed in a professional image despite the changing environment, in 554 
Bolbourne the focal actor’s fidelity to the professional logic saw her service terminated, while 555 
in Ashover the focal actor had to embrace alternative logics to secure her service’s future (see 556 
also Table 3). How might these divergent outcomes be explained? 557 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 558 
In all four cases, hard evidence about the efficiency or effectiveness of the services was 559 
in short supply (see Martin et al. 2012). Evidence of this nature was difficult for focal actors to 560 
generate—partly because they had never devised their services with such a crudely economic 561 
calculus in mind, but also because generating such evidence was difficult in genetics with its 562 
long-term, not short-term, outcomes: “it’s difficult to demonstrate their value or the amount of 563 
money they’re saving,” as a manager in Carsridge acknowledged (T3). Explanations for the 564 
divergent outcomes premised on a rationalistic understanding of organizational decision-565 
making can therefore be discounted. 566 
Yet while the services in Ashover, Carsridge and Dovington may have been no more 567 
cost-effective than that in Bolbourne, we have seen that as far as key decision-makers were 568 
concerned, they were more in keeping with how a service of this nature should look. Although 569 
all services lacked a clear economic rationale that would offer a firm alignment with the 570 
expectations of the market logic, this was more problematic for some than others. From our 571 
data, a number of explanations for this might be invoked, with differing degrees of support. 572 
First, it might be argued that the divergent outcomes were down to the differential skill 573 
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of the focal actors in making the case for their services. Other micro-level studies have noted 574 
the importance of actors who are “highly reflexive and somewhat creative in interpreting the 575 
pressures for institutional change” (Bévort & Suddaby 2015; cf. Smets & Jarzabkowski 2013; 576 
Currie & Spyridonidis 2016), and going against the ‘institutional grain’ clearly requires 577 
capacity for lateral thinking and persuasive ability. There was some support for this notion in 578 
our data. One decision-maker in Bolbourne intimated that the focal actor did not have “the right 579 
personality to go out there and engage people and get people stirred up” (T3). However, it was 580 
clearly not the case that any of the focal actors was naïve about the changing environment they 581 
were facing: over the course of our four interviews with each of them, they demonstrated an 582 
astute, reflexive understanding the changing healthcare system and the risks this posed to their 583 
services. And of course, unlike the seven other services sampled in our original evaluation, 584 
these focal actors had at least obtained initial local funding beyond the pilot monies provided 585 
by central government. 586 
A second plausible explanation is that the status and power enjoyed by the focal actors 587 
affected their ability to defy the vagaries of the shifting institutional prescriptions. Certainly 588 
the position of nurses in terms of professional status, authority and autonomy is weaker than 589 
that of physicians, in England and elsewhere (see, e.g., Battilana 2011). Socio-demographic 590 
characteristics such as gender may also contribute to this positional power. But while 591 
Ashover’s focal actor was a (white, female) nurse, there was little to differentiate the status of 592 
those in Bolbourne, Carsridge and Dovington, all of whom were doctors (white and female in 593 
Bolbourne and Dovington, white and male in Carsridge), albeit from different subspecialities. 594 
Indeed, if anything, the changes afoot over the study period—which saw more powers given 595 
to family physicians in terms of funding allocation, and encouragement of community-based 596 
over hospital-based care (Secretary of State for Health 2006)—should have raised the power 597 
of Bolbourne’s focal actor vis-à-vis that of Carsridge and Dovington’s. 598 
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A more convincing and comprehensive explanation is possible if we focus on neither 599 
actors’ social position nor their creative capacity per se, but on the consequences for these of 600 
the wider changes taking place in the field at the time. While the rise of the market logic over 601 
the period of the study applied equally across the English healthcare field, its effects at an 602 
organizational level were unequal. For the primary-care organizations that hosted the services 603 
in Ashover and Bolbourne, the rise of the market was unprecedented, and brought significant 604 
structural changes. As commissioning organizations (budget holders for the healthcare needs 605 
of the local population), they were required to relinquish their responsibility for service 606 
provision to enable competition for services that had been provided in-house. The services that 607 
had been a part of these organizations, including Ashover’s and Bolbourne’s genetics services, 608 
had to be reconstituted as financially independent standalone bodies, or incorporated into 609 
existing provider organizations. Consequently, the focal actors in Ashover and Bolbourne 610 
found themselves in the midst of a complicated process of organizational disengagement, and 611 
were cut adrift from their organizational sponsors. The focal actor in Ashover found that her 612 
new managers “didn’t have as much insight into the service and were less committed to seeing 613 
it expand” (T3), while in Bolbourne, the service’s manager had “less direct involvement” in the 614 
service, “although because there was not really anyone else to do it I did carry on to an extent” 615 
(T3). Further, and more critically, the focal actors were exposed to a range of expectations 616 
associated with the market logic that were foreign to them—and lacked the managerial support 617 
necessary to coherently argue their case in response. 618 
On the face of it, this challenge also applied to Carsridge and Dovington. However, here 619 
the services were hosted by hospitals with long experience of participating in a competitive 620 
market—and this equipped them much better to deal with the changing expectations of the new 621 
regime. The primary-care organizations in which Ashover’s and Bolbourne’s focal actors 622 
worked had only ever encountered the competitive market as budget holders, choosing between 623 
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competing bids: making a business case as a potential contractor was not something they had 624 
experienced before. As hospitals, the organizations in Carsridge and Dovington had long 625 
experience of a competitive market for secondary care that stretched back into the 1990s. Thus 626 
while the market-oriented shifts were just as dazzling to the focal actors themselves, they were 627 
surrounded by an established managerial infrastructure that was adept at managing such 628 
demands, and did not have to contend with rapid organizational change. They could rely instead 629 
on extensive managerial support—an instantiation of the corporate logic with its focus on the 630 
monitoring, audit and justification of professional activity—to deal with such shifts. 631 
The consequences for the ability of the focal actors to defend their services were 632 
profound. In Ashover and Bolbourne, they found themselves with little support and little idea 633 
of how to make a case for themselves: 634 
“Just after the pilot finished once we’d secured ongoing funding there was the 635 
commissioner-provider split, so the service went into mainstream services in the 636 
provider arm. […] I don't mean to sound derogatory, but I suppose the senior managers 637 
within the provider arm didn’t have as much insight in to the service and were less 638 
committed to seeing it expand.” (Focal actor, Ashover, T3) 639 
“My final line manager, essentially he and I put together a business plan very much on 640 
our own, and we met with the medical director and the deputy medical director and we 641 
put our case.” (Focal actor, Bolbourne, T3) 642 
In Carsridge and Dovington, focal actors enjoyed the full support of their organizations’ 643 
corporate apparatus: 644 
“The key relationship going forward […] is the relationship between our service, the 645 
business planning directorate, and their relationship with whatever commissioner 646 
organization exists after that, because we as a clinical service can’t keep up with 647 
changes in commissioning. But the business planning section do. And it’s that 648 
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relationship that’s really important.” (Focal actor, Carsridge, T2) 649 
“We have had no direct dealings with commissioners at any stage, because we are part 650 
of [a wider funding] envelope, from the point of view of the service that’s provided, it’s 651 
completely embedded in [the wider service].” (Focal actor, Dovington, T4) 652 
Intriguingly, then, in Carsridge and Dovington, the presence of a well established corporate 653 
logic, manifest in the activities of the hospitals’ dedicated business-planning staff, shielded the 654 
focal actors from the full force of the market logic, and enabled them to continue to enact the 655 
professional logic in the way they ran their services. Focal actors here could rely on others 656 
around them, carriers of the corporate logic but also well versed in the language of the market 657 
logic and the expectations of financial decision-makers, to frame their projects accordingly and 658 
deflect challenges: 659 
“What we’ve been doing is pulling together our experience and our outcomes in a brief 660 
report that we can send to the business-planning department of this hospital, so that they 661 
can use that in their negotiations.” (Focal actor, Carsridge, T3) 662 
In the absence of such support, Ashover and Bolbourne faced greater challenges. Bolbourne’s 663 
focal actor floundered, but in Ashover the focal actor was able to draw on her experience as a 664 
manager—her dual embeddedness in the professional and corporate logics (Pache & Santos 665 
2013)—to reframe her service. As we have seen, though, this came at the cost of transforming 666 
the service model itself, so that it was premised not on a professional logic but on notions of 667 
efficiency and throughput. For all four focal actors, however, the ability and opportunity to 668 
invoke and make advantageous use of logics was heavily shaped—one might even say 669 
structured—by influences beyond their capacity and social position as individual agents, but 670 
below the level of the field as a whole. Organizational context and the nature of their 671 
relationship with other agents—themselves affiliated with other logics—were crucial 672 
mediators of the relationship between field-level configuration of logics and individual-level 673 
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autonomy. 674 
Discussion 675 
Our paper seeks to bridge macro-level and micro-level work on responses to institutional 676 
complexity by using comparative, longitudinal analysis to examine the conditions under which 677 
actors are able to defy changing institutional prescriptions. In particular, we show that a 678 
common ‘constellation’ of institutional logics (Goodrick & Reay 2011; Waldorff et al. 2013) 679 
could give rise to divergent outcomes at the level of practice. Constellations are thus not just 680 
‘celestial’ features of the field-level ‘sky’: the relationship between logics was also realized 681 
through the work of actors on the ‘ground’. Most notably, whereas the corporate logic aligned, 682 
as the literature predicts (Thornton 2002; Martin et al. 2015), with the market logic in some 683 
cases, in others it proved a remarkably robust defence for the professional logic against the 684 
market logic. But none of the actors had free rein to pick and choose from the plurality of logics 685 
present in this complex field. Rather, influences above the level of the actor but below that of 686 
the field were important mediators and shapers of autonomy.  687 
As noted above, much of the micro-level work on the enactment of institutional logics 688 
‘at the coalface’ has focused on the ‘hypermuscular’ work of institutional entrepreneurs with 689 
unusual degrees of power, deriving from their social position, their “reflexivity or insight” and 690 
“their superior political and social skills” (Hardy & Maguire 2008, p.211). But even where 691 
studies have looked at the day-to-day work of lower-profile actors, they have often found a 692 
high level of autonomy, and attributed this to the creative capacity or social position of the 693 
individuals studied. For example, Bévort and Suddaby (2015) suggest that liberation from 694 
institutional prescriptions “appears to rest in the differential ability of some individuals in a 695 
common field to interpret the phenomenological fragility of logics and to be somewhat immune 696 
to their ‘totalizing’ cognitive influence.” Greenwood et al. (2011, p.349), summarizing the state 697 
of the field, submit that the ability to advance the prescriptions of one logic over others is in 698 
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part “a function of how logics are given voice within the organization; but the ability of a voice 699 
to be heard is linked to the influence of that logic’s field-level proponents over resources.” One 700 
way or another, these studies suggest that the ability to selectively enact logics derives 701 
primarily from some combination of status and creativity. But as Hallett (2010, p.67) 702 
acknowledges, this ability is produced (and denied) at a “supra-individual,” social level. And 703 
a key level at which this process takes place, we argue, is the organizational level, and 704 
particularly the way in which logics are configured and represented in organizational processes 705 
and personnel. 706 
Others have shown how organizations can act as ‘filters’, whereby different 707 
organizational units are subject to different institutional logics. Binder (2007, p.562), for 708 
example, finds that actors in different sections of the community organization she studied enact 709 
different logics, since different constellations of logics predominate: those in the housing 710 
department follow a more corporate logic, since “there are no countervailing institutional logics 711 
that staff in this department draw on.” This reflects the findings of others about how in some 712 
fields, institutional complexity is ‘segmented’: some prescriptions apply to one group of actors; 713 
others to another (e.g. Pache & Santos 2010). In other settings, collaboration across logics may 714 
be a prerequisite for organizational functioning (e.g. McPherson & Sauder 2013; Smets et al. 715 
2015). What we witness in this study, however, is a combination of what Besharov and Smith 716 
(2014) call high centrality and low compatibility: a field characterized by multiple institutional 717 
logics which must all be adhered to, and yet are mutually conflicting. This results in what they 718 
term ‘conflicted’ organizations, and they recount many examples from the literature of where 719 
this has led to organizational dysfunction or even disintegration. Yet, as Besharov and Smith 720 
(2014) argue, centrality and compatibility are not determined only at the field level: they are 721 
also a function of organizational form. Since ‘structurally differentiated hybrids’—in which 722 
the influences of different logics sit side-by-side, in different units in the same organization 723 
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(Greenwood et al. 2011)—are especially vulnerable to dysfunction (e.g. Battilana & Dorado 724 
2010; Greenwood et al. 2011), Besharov and Smith suggest two organizational interventions 725 
to mitigate this: recruiting personnel without prior institutional affiliations (to move from a 726 
structurally differentiated hybrid towards a blended hybrid, thereby reducing logic 727 
incompatibility), or reducing resource dependency by shifting strategic focus (to diminish the 728 
number of logics that must be accounted for, thereby reducing logic centrality). But these are 729 
not options for all organizations, particularly in the public services, where structural 730 
differentiation is itself necessary for legitimacy (and so blending is difficult to achieve) (see 731 
Greenwood et al. 2011, p.355), and organizational objectives are externally dictated (and so 732 
shifting strategic focus is not tenable). Logics’ influence cannot always be reduced in this way. 733 
What our findings suggest is how the tension between logics can be managed even where 734 
structural differentiation, so prone to disintegration, is necessary.  What appears crucial is the 735 
internal configuration of structurally differentiated units.  Thus in Carsridge and Dovington, 736 
the presence of carriers of the corporate logic in a separate unit—who could intervene actively 737 
to moderate its influence on their professional colleagues—paradoxically helped to secure 738 
latitude for the focal actors; the lack of such a buffering influence in Ashover and Bolbourne 739 
resulted in constraint.1 We suggest, therefore, that at least in public-service organizations, 740 
efforts to hire or socialize ‘non-affiliated’ staff to create blended hybrids that increase 741 
compatibility, or realign mission to reduce logic centrality, are likely to be forlorn or even 742 
counterproductive: attention might be more appropriately addressed to developing a cordial, 743 
interdependent and mutually beneficial relationship between carriers of logics in structurally 744 
differentiated units. Indeed, in Ashover the focal actor’s socialization (or dual embeddedness) 745 
                                                          
1 It might be noted in passing that of the seven services included in the original evaluation 
which did not obtain post-pilot funding, three had organizational set-ups involving 
collaboration between two or more host organizations (see Table 1). This may have added 
complication to the relationship among logics and their carriers, accounting in part for their 
failure to secure post-pilot funding, though we do not have the data to sustain this argument.  
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within both the professional and the corporate logic proved a mixed blessing, enabling the 746 
service to continue but only through transformation in its character. Boxenbaum and Battilana 747 
(2005, p.359) echo Besharov and Smith’s (2014) contention that staff with multiple 748 
institutional affiliations can help to reduce incompatibility and increase autonomy: “the more 749 
contexts individuals are embedded in, the more options they have available for transposing 750 
practices.” But while this helped Ashover’s focal actor avoid the termination of the service that 751 
occurred in Bolbourne, it offered her substantially less discretion than that enjoyed by the focal 752 
actors in Carsridge and Dovington. Dual embeddedness may then improve actors’ access to 753 
different logics, but it does not necessarily give them freedom of choice in enacting them. The 754 
configuration of organizations and the carriers of logics within them, not just their composition, 755 
matters, and as such structurally differentiated hybrid arrangements have the potential, at least, 756 
to reconcile conflicting logics as effectively as blended hybrids. 757 
Understood this way, the findings of other micro-level studies that have emphasised the 758 
ingenuity of individual actors might be seen in a slightly different light. For example, Murray 759 
(2010, p.379) sees the response of scientists to unfamiliar commercial pressures arising from 760 
the patenting of the genetic modification of ‘OncoMouse’ as the “sophisticated [production] of 761 
new hybrids,” in which the “expertise that allows [key actors] to transpose elements from each 762 
logic” to protect the autonomy of science was crucial. Yet it is also evident from her study that 763 
the privileged access to a wider, supportive, infrastructure—including “lawyers, TTO 764 
professionals, university counsel, and corporate executives”—was also critical to this 765 
endeavour: it was not expertise or status alone that enabled autonomy. McPherson and Sauder 766 
(2013, p.186) show that actors in a drugs court draw relatively freely upon a “shared toolkit” 767 
of logics in pursuit of their interests, but some actors are better placed than others to do so: the 768 
relational position of probation officers means they occupy a position of ‘brokerage’ that allows 769 
them privileged access to the ‘home’ logics of others, even though they lack the status of other 770 
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professional groups in the court.2 Heimer (1999, p.61) argues that in disputes about the care of 771 
neonates in intensive care, doctors’ arguments tend to overpower those of other actors because 772 
they are on their home turf, with greater knowledge of “how to get problems onto the agenda, 773 
how to propose their solutions in a persuasive way” and so on. She thus concludes that “the 774 
ranking of various professions [will shape] outcomes” of such disputes; “laws that are useful 775 
to high status professionals like physicians are more likely to be incorporated into NICU 776 
routines than laws that might be useful to lower status staff” (Heimer 1999, p.62). But our 777 
findings show that it is more than simple professional hierarchy that is important here: in itself, 778 
it is no guarantee of greater legitimacy, as the contrasting experiences of Ashover’s nurse and 779 
Bolbourne’s physician indicate. It was perhaps not then physicians’ position as “high status 780 
professionals” per se that was important in Heimer’s study, but the privileged access to wider 781 
resources and networks that this afforded. 782 
We suggest, then, that organizations—and specifically the way organizations instantiate 783 
relationships between multiple logics—thus contribute crucially not just to the availability of 784 
logics at individual level, but also to the manner in which they become available: the degree to 785 
which the appearance of a logic constrains or enables autonomy. Broadly, we propose three 786 
overarching alternative ways organizations might mediate the influence of logics, deploying a 787 
physics-based metaphor that we hope helps to convey the means by which different 788 
organizational forms may intervene in the transmission of logics. First, organizations may 789 
deflect logics, protecting those within them from the need to align with logical prescriptions. 790 
We did not see this in our study, but other studies (Binder 2007; Pache & Santos 2010; Jones 791 
1999), where organizations have the power to defy institutional expectations or buffer their 792 
members from the influence of competing logics, might be conceptualized in this way. Second, 793 
they may simply transmit logics, so that prescriptions are largely unmediated and it is left to 794 
                                                          
2 We thank an anonymous reviewer for drawing this connection to our attention. 
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individual-level actors to resolve (or fail to resolve) the contradictions between competing 795 
logics. We see this in Ashover and Bolbourne, where the professional actors were left exposed 796 
to the vagaries of new prescriptions from the market logic in the absence of an effective 797 
corporate buffer. Third, they may refract logics, altering or refocusing their influence and 798 
thereby offering some shield to individuals and opportunity for autonomy. We see this in 799 
Carsridge and Dovington, where a functional relationship between carriers of the corporate and 800 
professional logics saw the former shield the latter from some aspects of new institutional 801 
prescriptions, such that they retained autonomy. The notion of refraction has some similarities 802 
with one of the oldest concepts in the institutionalist repertoire, that of decoupling (Meyer & 803 
Rowan 1977). However, as our choice of metaphor indicates, we consider this to be more than 804 
a simple matter of one organizational unit providing legitimacy in the terms of the corporate 805 
logic, while another, decoupled unit continues its own work untainted. Rather, by refraction 806 
we mean that the institutional logic, like white light passing through a prism, is slowed, bent 807 
or even dispersed into its component parts. Thus in the cases of Carsridge and Dovington, staff 808 
in business-planning units were able to translate the requirements of the market and corporate 809 
logics into terms comprehensible to the services’ professional leads, and then reframe the 810 
professional leads’ cases back into terms that would satisfy the expectations of the corporate 811 
and market logics. This was not so much a decoupling, then, as a conscious, selective coupling. 812 
Though carriers of the corporate logic, the relationship between these business-planning units 813 
and professional clinicians was organized in a way that encouraged co-operation, enabling this 814 
refraction to take place—in stark contrast to the situation in Ashover and Bolbourne. The 815 
notions of deflection, transmission and refraction represent a tentative typology requiring 816 
validation and further development, but might serve as an initial touchstone for further 817 
investigation of the organizational-level mediation of institutional logics. 818 
For all four focal actors, then, creative capacity, professional status and embeddedness 819 
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in the rules and norms of different logics were only as good as the organizational setting and 820 
social relationships they enjoyed. Autonomy was constrained where these were lacking and 821 
enabled when these were favourable. Over the period studied, institutional prescriptions were 822 
consolidated, with greater centralization of logics and the ascendency of market and corporate 823 
logics that seemed incompatible with the professional logic. Both of these changes should work 824 
to constrain actors’ autonomy. Nevertheless, meso-level features of organizations within the 825 
field made a significant difference to the consequences for actors, maintaining latitude for some 826 
while others faced constraint (cf. Besharov & Smith 2014). We contend that attending to these 827 
features could go a long way towards explaining the disjuncture between macro- and micro-828 
level findings about the partial autonomy afforded to professionals at the coalface. 829 
Our analysis offers several suggestions for future research. In particular, we suggest that 830 
more attention to the meso-level mediators of agency, perhaps building on the typology we 831 
outline above, would help to understand how the prescriptions and openings for discretion at 832 
the field level do or do not translate into opportunities at the individual level. Further work that 833 
combines a detailed, phenomenological understanding of micro-level activity with comparison 834 
of similar or divergent contexts would be helpful. Relatedly, further conceptual development 835 
of Thornton et al.’s (2012, p.7) notion of “avenues for partial autonomy” would be helpful in 836 
reconciling macro- and micro-level work in the field of neo-institutionalism. As noted above, 837 
while many macro-level studies claim to show how institutional complexity affords 838 
opportunities for autonomy, they often remain steadfastly structuralist in the way they describe 839 
these (e.g. Waldorff et al. 2013). Finally, we strongly endorse Greenwood et al.’s (2011) call 840 
for research that embraces the impact of the coexistence of more than two logics, and Thornton 841 
and Ocasio’s (2008) point that what constitutes a logic needs to be carefully considered by 842 
those seeking to study their effects. The market and corporate logics appear, on the face of it, 843 
to present a concerted threat to the professional logic in rapidly changing fields such as 844 
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healthcare. Indeed, others have analysed their impact collectively: for example Reay and 845 
Hinings’ (2005, p.358) logic of ‘business-like healthcare’ combines elements of both. But we 846 
show that the experience of the two logics can diverge in different contexts, and that they do 847 
not necessarily operate synergistically in practice. We therefore recommend careful 848 
disaggregation of logics (and perhaps their constituent elements) in future studies. 849 
Conclusion 850 
Through comparative study of the trajectories of four change initiatives in a complex 851 
organizational field, we have sought in this paper to contribute to the institutional logics 852 
literature by examining the divergent consequences of a common constellation of logics for 853 
actors in different organizational contexts. Actor autonomy, so often valorized in micro-level 854 
studies of institutional logics in action, depended greatly on mediating factors at the meso level: 855 
opportunities for autonomy were determined neither at the field level nor in the status and 856 
creativity of individual actors. Rather, organizations—not just as containers of carriers of logics 857 
(Besharov & Smith 2014) but more importantly, as configurations of relationships between 858 
those carriers—constituted a prism which could act to transmit field-level institutional 859 
prescriptions into micro-level constraints, or refract them into something more pliable and 860 
productive. Further research taking a ‘nested’ case-study approach—studying multiple cases 861 
across two more fields where logics are arranged in different constellations—may be fruitful 862 
in adding further nuance to our understanding of how logics facilitate or obstruct discretion, 863 
and with what consequences for day-to-day practice and indeed reproduction and change in 864 
organizational fields. 865 
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Table 1: Overview of the 11 pilots included in the original evaluation 1003 
 Stream Pilot lead Profession 
of lead 
Host organization(s) Continued 
post-pilot? 
Reasons for non-continuation 
Ashover Cancer genetics  Nurse by background; 
now manager 
Nurse Primary care 
organization 
Yes  
Bolbourne General practitioner 
with a special interest 
General practitioner  Physician Primary care 
organization 
Yes  
Carsridge Cancer genetics Clinical geneticist Physician Hospital organization Yes  
Dovington Service development Specialist physician Physician Hospital organization Yes  
E Cancer genetics Nurse Nurse Consortium of primary 
care organizations 
No Reconfiguration of primary care 
organizations and consequent failure to 
agree to continued funding 
F Cancer genetics Clinical geneticist Physician Two hospital 
organizations 
No Failure to agree to continued funding 
(scaled down version maintained in one 
hospital) 
G Service development Specialist physician Physician Three hospital 
organizations 
No Conflict over allocation of resources and 
professional roles among host organizations 
leads to agreement to discontinue 
H Service development Specialist physician Nurse Hospital organization No Project ceased at end of funding; results 
included in guidelines for referrals to 
genetics service 
I General practitioner 
with a special interest 
General practitioner Physician Primary care 
organization 
No Always intended to be a time-limited 
educational intervention 
J General practitioner 
with a special interest 
General practitioner Physician Primary care 
organization 
No Geneticists refuse to support (see Martin et 
al. 2009) 
K General practitioner 
with a special interest 
General practitioner Physician Primary care 
organization 
No Limited ongoing ‘associate’ role under 
geneticist super vision (see Martin et al. 
2009) 
 1004 
  1005 
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Table 2: Summary of the four cases 1006 
 Service model Profession of 
focal actor 
Initial host Number of interviews 
T1 T2 T3 T4 Total 
Ashover Implemented a national model to provide cancer-genetics risk assessment and 
triage using primary care-based staff, and wider health-promotion advice aimed 
at high-risk groups  
Nurse Primary care 
organization 
12 
 
2 
 
12 
 
2 
 
28 
Bolbourne General practitioner with a special interest: provides training and advice to other 
GPs to inform proper management and referral of patients with suspected 
genetic conditions 
Physician Primary care 
organization 
5 2 7 1 15 
Carsridge Implemented a national model to provide cancer-genetics risk assessment and 
triage provided by secondary care-based staff, replacing ad hoc provision by 
oncologists and surgeons 
Physician Hospital 
organization 
12 2 10 2 26 
Dovington New multidisciplinary clinic, incorporating mainstream and specialist consultant-
led care, for a group with a genetic disorder previously seen in separate clinics 
Physician Hospital 
organization 
6 2 5 1 14 
1007 
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Table 3: The differential translation of institutional change across cases 1008 
 Time Ashover Bolbourne Carsridge and Dovington 
Focal actor  Nurse/manager Physician Physician 
Organizational 
host 
 PCT (T1); PCT provider arm (T2-T3); 
community provider organization (T4) 
PCT (T1); PCT provider arm (T2-T3) Hospital organization 
Original logic 
espoused by 
focal actors 
T1 
(2005-6) 
Professional 
Emphasis on ensuring holistic care and 
addressing public health, rather than 
providing a narrow care pathway delivered 
by deskilled occupational group 
Professional 
Emphasis on utilizing broad skills of a family 
physician to facilitate holistic care, rather 
than replicating work done by lower-status 
occupational groups. 
Professional 
Emphasis on ensuring patient-centred care 
delivered by a highly skilled professional 
team, rather than a narrow care pathway 
delivered by deskilled occupational group 
Impact of rise of 
market logic 
T2-T3 
(2008-10) 
Market logic conflicts with professional 
logic; corporate logic exacerbates 
Market logic conflicts with professional 
logic; corporate logic exacerbates 
Market logic conflicts with professional 
logic; corporate logic mitigates 
Response of 
focal actors 
T2-T3 
(2008-10) 
Focal actor adapts behaviour to comply 
with market and corporate logics 
Focal actor defends alignment with 
professional logic 
Focal actors draw on corporate apparatus 
to shelter service from market logic 
Outcome T3-T4 
(2010-11) 
Service is transformed in character: 
reflects market and corporate logics 
Service is discontinued: focal actor’s 
defence fails to deflect market logic 
Services are maintained unaltered: 
corporate logic shields professional logic  
 1009 
